We consider pursuit-evasion differential game of countable number inertial players in Hilbert space with integral constraints on the control functions of players. Duration of the game is fixed. The payoff functional is the greatest lower bound of distances between the pursuers and evader when the game is terminated. The pursuers try to minimize the functional, and the evader tries to maximize it. In this paper, we find the value of the game and construct optimal strategies of the players.
Introduction and Preliminaries
Many books have been devoted to differential games, such as books by Isaacs Constructing the player's optimal strategies and finding the value of the game are of specific interest in studying of differential games.
The pursuit-evasion differential games involving several objects with simple motions take the attention of many authors. Ivanov and Ledyaev 5 studied simple motion differential game of several players with geometric constraints. They obtained sufficient conditions to find optimal pursuit time in R n , by using the method of the Lyapunov function for an auxiliary problem.
Levchenkov and Pashkov 6 investigated differential game of optimal approach of two identical inertial pursuers to a noninertial evader on a fixed time interval. Control parameters were subject to geometric constraints. They constructed the value function of the game and used necessary and sufficient conditions which a function must satisfy to be the value function 7 .
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Chodun 8 examined evasion differential game with many pursuers and geometric constraints. He found a sufficient condition for avoidance.
Ibragimov 9 obtained the formula for optimal pursuit time in differential game described by an infinite system of differential equations. In 10 simple motion differential game of many pursuers with geometric constraints was investigated in the Hilbert space l 2 .
In the present paper, we consider a pursuit-evasion differential game of infinitely many inertial players with integral constraints on control functions. The duration of the game θ is fixed. The payoff functional of the game is the greatest lower bound of the distances between the evader and the pursuers at θ. The pursuer's goal is to minimize the payoff, and the evader's goal is to maximize it. This paper is close in spirit to 10 . We obtain a sufficient condition to find the value of the game and constructed the optimal strategies of players.
Formulation of the Problem
In the space l 2 consisting of elements α α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k , . . . , with
< ∞, and inner product α, β ∞ k 1 α k β k , the motions of the countably many pursuers P i and the evader E are defined by the equations
where As a real life example, one may consider the case of a missile catching an aircraft. If the initial positions and speeds first derivative of both missile and aircraft are given and the constraints of both missile and aircraft are their available fuel, which could be mathematically interpreted as the mean average of their acceleration function second derivative , then the corresponding pursuit-evasion problem is described by 2.1 .
A ball resp., sphere of radius r and center at the point x 0 is denoted by H x 0 , r {x ∈ l 2 : x − x 0 ≤ r} resp., by S x 0 , r {x ∈ l 2 :
. . , are Borel measurable functions and
where ρ i is given positive number, is called an admissible control of the ith pursuer.
where σ is a given positive number, is called an admissible control of the evader.
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Once the players' admissible controls u i · and v · are chosen, the corresponding motions x i · and y · of the players are defined as 
2.4
One can readily see that x i · , y · ∈ C 0, θ; l 2 , where C 0, θ; l 2 is the space of functions
such that the following conditions hold:
. . , are absolutely continuous functions; 
that the countable system of equations γ, then we say that the game has the value γ 7 . It is to find optimal strategies U i0 and V 0 of the players P i and E, respectively, and the value of the game. Instead of differential game described by 2.1 we can consider an equivalent differential game with the same payoff function and described by the following system:
Indeed, if the pursuer P i uses an admissible control u i t u i1 t , u i2 t , . . . , 0 ≤ t ≤ θ, then according to 2.1 we have
and the same result can be obtained by 2.9
Also, for the evader the same argument can be made, therefore in the distance x i θ − y θ we can take either the solution of 2.1 or the solution of 2.9 . The attainability domain of the pursuer P i at time θ from the initial state x i0 at time t 0 0 is the closed ball H x i0 , ρ i θ 3 /3 1/2 . Indeed, by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
2.12
On the other hand, if x ∈ H x i0 , ρ i θ
, then for the pursuer's control
we obtain x i θ x.
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The pursuer's control is admissible because
2.14 Likewise, the attainability domain of the evader E at time θ from the initial state y 0 at time t 0 0 is the closed ball H y 0 , σ θ 3 /3 1/2 .
An Auxiliary Game
In this section we fix the index i and study an auxiliary differential game of two players P i and E, also for simplicity we drop the index i and use the notion ρ i ρ, x i0 x 0 and x i x. Let
where p is an arbitrary fixed unit vector. Consider the one-pursuer game described by the equations
with the state of the evader E being subject to y θ ∈ X. The goal of the pursuer P is to realize the equality x τ y τ at some τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ θ, and that of the evader E is opposite. We define the pursuer's strategy as follows: if x 0 y 0 , then we set
and if x 0 / y 0 , then we set
where e y 0 − x 0 / y 0 − x 0 , and
where τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ θ, is the time instant at which x τ y τ for the first time. 
3.7
In particular, x θ y θ . Let x 0 / y 0 . By 3.5 and 3.6 , we have y t − x t ef t , where
ds.
3.8
Obviously f 0 y 0 − x 0 > 0. Now we show that f θ ≤ 0. This will imply that f τ 0 for some τ ∈ 0, θ .
To this end we consider the following two-dimensional vector function:
For the last integral of 3.8 we have 
3.11
By assumption, y θ ∈ X, therefore 2 y 0 − x 0 , y θ ≤ θ 
3.15
Now we show that the right-hand side of the last inequality is equal to zero. We show 
